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emitting less than 200 GtCO2 in the 2000–2050 period), 
it makes sense to implement some of the more expensive 
options before the potential of the cheapest ones has been 
exhausted. With abatement targets expressed in terms of 
emissions at one point in time (e.g., reducing emissions 
by 20 percent in 2020), it can even be preferable to start 
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Abstract
This article investigates the use of expert-based Marginal Abatement Cost Curves (MACC)
to design abatement strategies. It shows that introducing inertia, in the form of the ￿cost in
time￿ of available options, changes signi￿cantly the message from MACCs. With an abatement
objective in cumulative emissions (e.g., emitting less than 200 GtCO 2 in the 2000-2050 period),
it makes sense to implement some of the more expensive options before the potential of the
cheapest ones has been exhausted. With abatement targets expressed in terms of emissions at
one point in time (e.g., reducing emissions by 20% in 2020), it can even be preferable to start
with the implementation of the most expensive options if their potential is high and their inertia
signi￿cant. Also, the best strategy to reach a short-term target is di￿erent depending on whether
this target is the ultimate objective or there is a longer-term target. The best way to achieve
Europe’s goal of 20% reduction in emissions by 2020 is di￿erent if this objective is the ultimate
objective or if it is only a milestone in a trajectory toward a 75% reduction in 2050. The cheapest
options may be su￿cient to reach the 2020 target but could create a carbon-intensive lock-in
and preclude deeper emission reductions by 2050. These results show that in a world without
perfect foresight and perfect credibility of the long-term carbon-price signal, a unique carbon
price in all sectors is not the most e￿cient approach. Sectoral objectives, such as Europe’s 20%
renewable energy target in Europe, fuel-economy standards in the auto industry, or changes
in urban planning, building norms and infrastructure design are a critical part of an e￿cient
mitigation policy.
Keywords: marginal abatement cost curves, MACC, inertia, when-￿exibility, how-￿exibility, opti-
mal abatement strategy, merit-order, timing, dynamic e￿ciency.
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11 Introduction
To design the best policies to cope with climate change, decision-makers need information about
the various options to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Such information has been provided
to the public in many di￿erent ways, including in the form of Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC)
curves. Kesicki (2010) calls expert-based MAC curves (here, we simply refer to them as MAC curves
or MACCs) the curves that represent information on abatement costs and potentials for a set of
mitigation activities.2
MAC curves are usually constructed for a speci￿c country or region, and for a speci￿c time
horizon. They report abatement potentials that can be achieved as a function of the abatement
cost (Fig. 1). They are constructed following a bottom-up approach: they assess a set of available
mitigation options, each taken independently. Where they have been developed, they have proved
useful to communicate about abatement options and potentials.
MACCs rank potential mitigation options from the least to the most expensive one. By doing
so, they look like ￿merit-order curves￿, which are used to describe various production options that
are instantly available at a given point in time to satisfy a demand at a given price. In the power
generation sector, for instance, merit-order curves are used as supply curves (Fig. 2): crossing them
with demand curves actually gives the optimal dispatch (Ongsakul, 1999).
This similarity in the presentation could suggest that MAC curves can be used as conventional
supply curves too ￿ this is done for instance in an early attempt by Jackson (1991). If MACCs were
conventional supply curves, an abatement activity should be implemented when the carbon price
is larger or equal to its marginal abatement cost. In this case, a cost-minimizing strategy would
exhaust the cheapest available options, before progressively turning to more expensive options until
the committed abatement level is reached.
This paper shows that MACCs are di￿erent from merit-order curves because they include ac-
tivities that could take decades to implement. Because of this inertia (Grubb et al, 1995), the
implementation schedule of the various options ￿ and even the choice of mitigation options ￿
suggested by a naive interpretation of MACCs is suboptimal.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the optimal timing of GHG emissions abatement
(choice across time) along with the optimal dispatch of the reduction burden (choice across abatement
activities). To do so, we introduce inertia ￿ in the form of a cost in time of each activity ￿ in
a MAC curve and use an inter-temporal optimization model to investigate the ￿when-￿exibility￿ on
the implementation of various abatement options. The cost in time makes it possible to distinguish
2In this paper, we call these abatement options ￿ activities￿, following the terminology from Rodrik (2004). Activities
include changing technologies, notably in the car and power sectors, but also non-technological options such as modal
shift in the transportation, waste recycling, reforestation or building retro￿tting sectors. While the terms ￿MAC curve￿
can also refer to di￿erent curves, as those named model-derived MAC curves by Kesicki (2010) and studied for instance




























Figure 1: An expert-based MAC curve exhibits abatements options 1::N characterized by their maximum
potential amax and their marginal cost c, ranked from the least to the most expensive one. The classical in-
terpretation, challenged in this paper, is that the optimal strategy for achieving abatement X is to implement
all the activities cheaper than Y.
available abatement activities not only using their costs and potentials, but also the time it takes
to implement them. For instance, it allows taking into account the fact that urban planning may
be cheaper and have a higher potential to reduce emissions than technological change in the car
industry, but is also much slower and requires much more anticipation to be e￿ective (Gusdorf et al,
2008).
Con￿rming previous results from Lecocq et al (1998) and Jaccard and Rivers (2007), introducing
inertia changes the order in which various options should be implemented, and ￿ under some
conditions ￿ can make it optimal to start with the introduction of the most expensive options.
Moreover, with inertia, a uniform carbon price across sectors cannot trigger the optimal dispatch
of activities, unless its long-term evolution is perfectly credible and economic actors have perfect
foresight. In a realistic setting ￿ one with inertia, public-policy long-term credibility issues, and
imperfect foresight ￿ it can make sense to use sector-speci￿c complementary policies such as Europe’s
20% renewable energy target in Europe or fuel economy standards in the auto industry (An et al,
2007).
The article starts with a review of the literature on two parallel research questions: the MAC
curves methodology and limits (Section 2.1) and the timing of mitigation strategies (Section 2.2).
Section 3 then presents a model that computes the least-cost abatement strategy to reach a climate
objective, taking into account technological ceilings, costs and inertia. In Section 4, this model is
used to design an optimal abatement strategy to reach an objective expressed in terms of cumu-
lative emissions (for instance emitting less than 200 GtCO 2 over the 2000-2050 period). We show



































Figure 2: Merit order in the power generation sector. The graph exhibits a supply curve (S) made by
aggregating 8 available power plants and a demand curve (D). Each power plant is characterized by available
capacities (in MW) and a marginal cost (in $/MW). The optimal response to the demand is to call power
plants 1 to 6 and to let 7 and 8 idle.
necessarily exhaust all cheap abatement options before starting to implement more expensive ones.
In Section 5, we examine optimal strategies to achieve emission targets at one point in time (e.g.,
Europe’s goal of reducing emissions by 20% by 2020). In this case, we demonstrate it can make sense
to start with the most expensive options rather than with the cheapest. We also show why MAC
curves should not be used as supply curves to ￿nd the optimal ￿activity mix￿ to achieve a particular
abatement at a given time horizon. Instead, this mix strongly depends on longer-run objectives, so
that the optimal activity mix to reach a given target in 2020 is strongly dependent on the objective
for later years (e.g. 2050). Our conclusion (Section 6) discusses how to translate a general climate
objective (whether expressed in cumulative emissions, carbon budget or concentration) into sectoral
objectives in terms of emissions at one point in time, and shows that MAC curves could be usefully
extended to account for additional information on inertia.
2 Literature review
2.1 Expert-based MAC curves usage and their limitations
Expert-based MAC curves are built in a bottom-up, engineering, approach. They investigate avail-
able technical options to mitigate GHG emissions, and present them in terms of their abatement
potential and marginal cost. Kesicki (2010) proposes a de￿nition of expert-based MAC curves and
a review of their use in the literature. They di￿er from model-based MACC curves (Klepper and
Peterson, 2006) which are outside of the scope of this paper and therefore not discussed here.
McKinsey and Company have built expert-based MAC curves assessing potentials in the USA
4in 2030 (McKinsey and Company, 2007) and Ireland in 2030 (Motherway and Walker, 2009). The
World Bank has assessed Poland’s and Mexico’s reduction potentials in 2030 in the form of MACCs
(Poswiata and Bogdan, 2009; Johnson et al, 2009). And Sweeney and Weyant (2008) have proposed
a MAC curve for California in 2020. MAC curves are designed to provide synthetic and easily usable
information to policymakers. Their use has however been criticized. For instance, Ekins et al (2011)
mention that:
 MAC curves generally neglect non-climate bene￿ts such as air pollution reduction or increase
in energy security. They also neglect co-costs, like negative distributional impacts.
 They do not account for synergies between abatement activities (e.g., MACCs do not report
that promoting electric vehicles and green electricity together would allow to save more GHG
than the sum of the two isolated abatement activities).
 They also neglect possible rebound e￿ects (Greening et al, 2000) and the need for behavioral
or institutional changes.
 They assess project or technological costs only, excluding institutional barriers and transac-
tion costs. This is the classical explanation for why MAC curves often report negative-costs
abatement options ￿ so-called no-regret options (BrØchet and Jouvet, 2009).
These weaknesses are due to the fact that MAC curves are developed in a bottom-up framework.
However, this approach has advantages compared with integrated assessments, which often appear
as ￿black-boxes￿, and has proved useful for communication and debate.
In this paper, the main criticism we address to the MAC curves is not related to the way they
are built, but rather to the interpretation made of them. As we will show, one major issue with the
MAC curves is that they do not take into account inter-temporal dynamics and inertia, which play
a key role in determining the optimal timing of abatement options.
2.2 The timing of mitigation strategies
The optimal timing of greenhouse gases abatement to limit climate change is widely discussed in the
literature. In many cases, these discussions are developed with models that represent the economy
as one single aggregated sector. For instance, the topic has emerged from arguments in favor of
postponing emission reductions, proposed by Nordhaus (1992), Hammitt et al (1992) and Wigley
et al (1996). Those arguments include the risk of sunk investments if climate change reveals less
threatening than expected, and the role of discounting. Others have studied the e￿ect of technical
change (Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Manne and Richels, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006), the risk of early
impact of climate change and the interplay between uncertainty in the carbon and climate cycles
and irreversible investments (Ha-Duong et al, 1997; Ambrosi et al, 2003). A more complete literature
review can be found in Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007).
5A di￿erent approach investigate the link between when- and how-￿exibility using models with
multiple sectors. Lecocq et al (1998), Gilotte (2004) and Jaccard and Rivers (2007) focus on the role
that long-lived capital plays in the design of mitigation policies. They argue that the di￿erences in
inertia across di￿erent economic sectors matter, and that the design of optimal abatement strategies
cannot therefore be investigated using aggregated models. Lecocq et al (1998) conclude that in
absence of perfect foresight, classical policy instruments (such as a carbon price) might not be
enough to decarbonize economies at low costs, and they call for speci￿c policies directed toward
green infrastructure and long-lived capital. Jaccard and Rivers (2007) ￿nd that early action is
preferable in long-lived capital sectors, even if marginal costs are higher there.
A third branch of the literature studies the interplay between technology and environmental
policies (Ja￿e et al, 2005). They often focus on the e￿ect of the learning by doing (LBD) when
there are several available technologies and imperfect foresight (Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2007;
del Rio Gonzalez, 2008). In this framework, carbon prices cannot trigger investments in the most
promising solutions if initial costs are too high; targeted policies are therefore needed to encourage
early action and initiate costs reductions.
Our contribution is threefold: ￿rst, we to develop a new ￿ independent from LBD ￿ argument
for early action in some expensive activities, based on the interplay of inertia and high abatement
potentials; second we show that factoring in inertia is not only necessary for sectors like infrastructure
and urbanism, but that information on the implementation inertia of all abatement activities is
critical to design optimal strategies; third, we show that MAC curves can easily be extended to
account for this additional information.
3 Model description
Our model is called MACinert (Marginal abatement cost curves and inertia). It is consistent with
the MAC curves framework (see Section 2.1), i.e. abatements are achieved by applying changes
to a ￿xed baseline. We do not incorporate more realistic but complex dynamics, such as capital
accumulation, learning-by-doing, sectoral interactions, or crowding-out e￿ect on investment. Instead,
a social planner controls GHG abatements from an emission baseline, by spending time and money
in abatement activities, characterized by a MAC curve and a ￿cost in time￿ ￿ the latter takes inertia
into account.
We then use this model to carry out simple numerical experiments. Parameters corresponds
roughly to the European Union situation, but these simulations have an illustrative purpose only.
They demonstrate what MACCs can and cannot do, and provide insight on how to use them.
63.1 GHG emissions
There are N abatement options, indexed by i. The model is run on a period that goes from 2000
to 2050 with a time step, t, of one year. At each time step t, emissions are computed from the
baseline emissions Ebase(t) and the abatement achieved with each activity i.




We assume constant baseline emissions, that is Ebase(t) = 5 GtCO2/yr.
The cumulative emissions M(t) are then computed as the sum of emissions:
M(t) = E(t)  t + M(t   1) (2)
M(0) = 0 (3)
3.2 Potentials, costs, and inertia
Abatements e￿orts in each sector are subject to two restrictions. First, each activity i has a technical
ceiling, i.e. a maximum abating potential amax(i), expressed in avoided annual emissions, i.e. in
MtCO2/yr. This potential is commonly represented by the rectangles width in MAC curves (see
Fig. 1). For instance, switching to more e￿cient thermal engines for personal vehicles could save a
fraction of GHG emissions associated with private mobility, but not more.
a(i;t)  amax(i) (4)
In the MAC curve, each activity i is quali￿ed with a constant marginal cost of abatement c(i) (see
Fig. 1). Here, we assume that marginal abatement costs are independent of cumulative abatements
and of time. In particular, we do not model technical change and learning-by-doing. Therefore,
abatements a(i;t) achieved thanks to activity i at time t have a cost I(i;t) which reads:
I(i;t) = a(i;t)  c(i) (5)
The innovation here is the introduction of inertia in the MACCs. Inertia is de￿ned by a ￿ cost in
time￿: a given amount of abatement requires to spend a positive amount of time for its implementa-
tion. This cost could be expressed in years per MtCO 2, and is assumed independent of the ￿nancial
cost of the option. In other words, there is a maximum amount of supplementary abatement that is
achievable with each activity during a given time interval, which is expressed in MtCO 2 per year.3
Let (i), in MtCO2/yr2, be the maximal incremental amount of GHG emissions abatement
achievable with activity i over a year. Note that (i) is the algebraic inverse of the ￿cost in time￿. For
3This modeling di￿ers from the time-to-build ￿ la Kydland and Prescott (1982). Time-to-build would re￿ect the
idea that there is an incompressible lag between investment decisions and actual abatements. With time-to-build, an
arbitrary large amount of abatements would require as much time to be implemented as a small abatement (if achieved
through the same activity). With our cost in time, in contrast, the time expenditures are proportional to the amount
of abatement, in the same way as ￿nancial expenditures.
7the sake of simplicity, we assume (i) is constant and does not depend on the previously achieved
abatements nor current time step t. In other terms, there is no learning-by-doing leading to a
reduction in the cost in time of an activity.
This , by introducing inertia in the modeling framework, also introduces path dependency:
achievable abatements at time t + 1 directly depend on already achieved abatements at time t.
a(i;t)  a(i;t   1) + (i)  t (6)
These costs in time may come from several factors, such as (i) availability of skilled workers, (ii)
availability of productive capacities, (iii) emissions being embedded in capital, and (iv) incompressible
institutional requirements. Points (i) and (ii) could be overcome by training workers or redirecting
unemployed workers and unused capital; but training and redirecting are activities per se and cannot
be done overnight either. The third point is related to capital vintages and turnover: if one sees
emissions as embedded in capital (Davis et al, 2010; Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011), decarbonization
cannot be faster than capital turnover, except by wasting valuable productive capital through early
scrappage (see Section 2.2). In the case of urban planning, transforming a city cannot be done in less
than decades, and an aggressive action can lead to strongly negative distributional impacts within
a city (Gusdorf et al, 2008). The issue of institutional or organizational delays is well documented
(World Bank, 2010). Reducing them is an activity per se, and takes time. We thus see the maximal
amount  as an exogenous constraint ￿ independent of the cost ￿ that the social planner must
take into account when searching for optimal abatement strategies.
3.3 Social planner objectives
The objective of the social planner is to achieve a climate-related target while minimizing abatement








(1 + )t (7)
Theoretically, the social planner could control GHG emissions in order to equalize the marginal
costs of mitigation and adaptation, in a cost-bene￿t approach as in Nordhaus (1992). Because
of uncertainty surrounding both climate response to a change in GHG emissions and adaptation
costs, and because decision-making is done at national scale (and not at the global scale as would be
required for a global public goods issue like climate change), it is common to adopt a cost-e￿ectiveness
approach (Ambrosi et al, 2003).
In our model, this can be done by constraining cumulative emissions M to remain below a given
objective Mobj.
M(t)  Mobj (8)
8Cumulative emissions can be used as proxies for climate change (Matthews et al, 2009; Mein-
shausen et al, 2009; Allen et al, 2009); in practice, however, governments and other public agencies
can hardly implement them. In contrast, they may provide emission objectives for given points in
time. To do so, they mostly rely on emissions targets. 4 For instance, the European Commission has
the objective of cutting its emissions by 20 % of 1990 levels by 2020. Other countries have di￿erent
objectives, such as the UK objective of cutting emissions by 75 % by 2050.
In our model, this type of objectives can be implemented by de￿ning a set of ￿milestones￿ indexed




For illustrative purpose, we assumed a MAC containing only two contrasted activities ( N = 2),
labeled ￿cheap￿ and ￿deep￿. Cheap has a lower abatement cost than deep, but the latter has a
greater abatement potential (see Tab. 1 and Fig. 3). Cheap could represent for instance the activity
of switching energy sources in the buildings, and deep could stand for retro￿tting those buildings. In
the auto industry, cheap could stand for energy e￿ciency gains in the internal combustion engines
and deep for switching to other energy sources, such as electricity or biofuels.
The cost in time is arbitrarily assumed to be equal to 50 MtCO 2/yr2 in both activities. As shown
by the ratios amax=, this means that deep presents more inertia than cheap, because implementing
the full potential of deep takes 60 years, while it takes only 30 years for cheap.
Abatement cost Abatement potential Maximal increment
c ( $/(tCO2)) amax ( MtCO2/yr)  ( MtCO2/yr2)
Cheap 30 1500 50
Deep 60 3500 50
Table 1: Numerical assumptions
These values are not meant to represent accurately concrete sectors of the economy. We use them
to carry out illustrative experiments, which help draw more general conclusions. We solve this simple
model using a linear programing algorithm provided by GAMS (Brook et al, 1988). The source code
is available upon request. The main results are presented in the next two sections.
4In the auto industry, it is common to adopt intensity objectives, expressed in gCO 2/km (An et al, 2007). In
the framework of a MAC curve, nonetheless, intensity targets can be treated as emission targets. The MACCs are
built assuming a given baseline; in particular, they assume that the aggregate driven distance is given (Sweeney and
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Figure 3: The MAC curve used in our experiments. According to the supply-curve interpretation, an
abatement of annual emission by 750 MtCO 2/yr should be achieved through the implementation of cheap
only.
4 Optimal timing with cumulative-emissions objectives
In this section, we investigate the optimal abatement pathway when using a constraint in terms of
cumulative emission, i.e. with full when-￿exibility on how to reduce emissions. Cumulative emissions
can be seen as good proxies for climate change (Matthews et al, 2009; Meinshausen et al, 2009; Allen
et al, 2009). This is implemented in our model by excluding Eq. 9, and using Eq. 8. We then test
several values of the objective (Mobj), and assess the consequence on the optimal reduction pathway.
4.1 Using expensive options before the potential of cheap ones is ex-
hausted
Figure 4: Optimal abatement strategy to limit cumulative emissions below 175 GtCO 2. Because of inertia
and discounting, the deep option enters before the potential of cheap has been exhausted.
Figure 4 shows the optimal strategy for maintaining cumulative emission below 175 GtCO 2.5
5Cumulative emissions in the baseline amount to 5 Gt/yr during 51 years, with a total of 255 Gt.
10This particular value is used for illustrative purpose, and will allow us to make some comparisons
with subsequent simulations with emissions targets (see Section 5).
The abatement paths have triangular or trapezoidal shapes; this shows that one of the inertia
(Eq. 6) or ceiling (Eq. 4) constraint is always binding. In this case, the intuitive ranking of abatement
activities is respected: the social planner starts implementing cheap before deep. But the social
planner does not use the full potential of cheap before starting using deep, which enters in 2017 while
cheap does not reach its ceiling before 2030. Moreover, a more stringent objective would force deep
to start even earlier (see below).
The optimal implementation strategy does not strictly follow an hypothetical merit-order in which
all the potential of the cheapest solutions is used before more expensive solutions are introduced.
This example illustrates why the MAC curves should not be interpreted as abatements supply curves.
A more systematic analysis using di￿erent cumulative emission objectives (Fig. 5) con￿rms that
￿ for any objective ￿ it is never preferable to implement the expensive deep before cheap. But
it shows that if the objective is stringent enough (about 210 GtCO 2), deep has to begin before all
the potential of cheap has been exploited; the implementation is not sequential. If it is even more
stringent (about 135 GtCO2), deep is forced to start in 2000, at the same time as cheap.
Figure 5: Entry date et ceiling date of each abatement activity as a function of the cumulative emission
objective. The entry date is the date when an activity begins to be implemented; the ceiling date is the date
when the full potential of an activity is achieved.
4.2 Expensive options may be useful even when cheaper ones appear
su￿cient
Let us ￿rst analyze a case in which the climate objective is not very restrictive, say 210 GtCO 2. This
translates into cumulative abatements of 45 GtCO 2 over the period.6 Cheap has a cumulative abate-
6Cumulative emissions in the baseline amount to 5 Gt/yr during 51 years, with a total of 255 Gt.
11ment potential of 54 GtCO2.7 It is then possible to achieve the abatement objective by implementing
cheap only, without implementing deep. A naive strategy could then focus on implementing cheap
and not implementing deep, because cheap has the lowest marginal cost. But our simulations show
that this is not the optimal strategy, because there is a trade-o￿ between (i) implementing only the
cheapest solutions, but starting early to give them enough time to reach the objective; (ii) delaying
abatements in order to save present value (thanks to the discounting), but undertaking both cheap
and deep to be more aggressive and reach the objective in spite of the delayed action.
In our simulations (Fig. 5), the optimal strategy to reach the (lax) 210 GtCO 2 objective calls deep
from year 2038, which makes it possible not to call cheap before 2009 (for a strategy starting in 2000).
The additional cost of using deep is more than compensated by the delay in the implementation of
cheap (again, thanks to the discounting). In other words, the optimal strategy uses an expensive
activity even when a cheaper activity appears su￿cient to attain the objective, in order to take
advantage of the discounting. Again, this result challenges the interpretation of MAC curves as
abatement supply curves providing a merit-order ranking. Furthermore, it rules out one of the most
common interpretation of the MACCs, namely that only the cheapest options should be implemented
in order to reach a given amount of abatements (see Fig. 1).
These experiments illustrate the importance of taking into account the interplay of discounting
with di￿erentiated inertias when designing a mitigation strategy. Interpreting a MAC curve as a
merit-order curve could lead to postpone expensive abatements after the cheap options are exhausted,
which would lead to suboptimal mitigation pathways. With discounting and inertia, it makes sense
to implement expensive abatement activities in parallel to cheap ones, to be more aggressive and be
able to postpone action. Of course, this conclusion does not take into account policy and behavior
inertia, and the incentive for policy-makers to delay action beyond their term of o￿ce, which justify
the use of emission targets (at one point in time) instead of cumulative-emission objectives.
Policymakers should be informed of abatement potentials and costs, and MAC curves provide
this information. But policymakers also need to be informed on the duration of the implementation
process of these activities. MAC curves would be more operational if they had a third dimension,
namely our ￿cost in time￿ for each abatement option.
5 Optimal abatement pathways with emission targets in 2050
Commitments in terms of cumulative emissions are di￿cult to introduce and enforce. Indeed, with
cumulative emissions, there is an incentive for decision-makers to delay investments and e￿orts
beyond their mandate. Alternatives policies include the de￿nition of emission targets at one or several
points in time. They can be enforced with tradable emissions permits, as the ETS system in Europe.
7Its annual abatement potential is 1.5 Gt/yr and takes 30 years to implement in full (see Tab. 1); adding the
cumulated potential during the take o￿ phase (30 yr  1.5 Gt/yr)/2 and the potential when annual abatements have
reached their ceiling 21 yr1.5 Gt/yr gives a total of 54 Gt.
12When these abatement commitments are well designed, the gain in realism and enforceability could
compensate for the loss of when-￿exibility. In the next two sections, we assume that commitments
are made in terms of abatement levels, at di￿erent points in time.
We thus exclude the cumulative-emissions constraint (Eq. 8) from our model, and make use of
the emission constraint with m 2 f1g; t1 = 2050 and varying E
obj
1 (Eq. 9). In absence of inertia ￿
i.e., with an in￿nite  in Eq. 6 ￿ the optimal response to an emission objective would be to remain
in the baseline emissions pathway from 2001 to 2049, and to implement abatement options in 2050
only.8 With inertia ￿ i.e., with a ￿nite  in Eq. 6 ￿ the optimal mitigation strategy depends on
the emission target.
5.1 Implementing expensive options before cheap ones
Figure 6: Optimal abatement pathways to achieve, in 2050, ambitious abatements (3.25 GtCO 2/yr). The
expensive option with large abatement potential is implemented before the cheaper option.
Figure 6 shows the optimal abatement pathway for achieving an ambitious reduction in emissions
in 2050, namely a reduction by 75%. It leads to a cumulative emissions of about 175 GtCO 2, which
makes this simulation comparable with the one proposed in Section 4.1.
In this case, the optimal strategy implements the expensive deep before implementing cheap.
Indeed, the emission objective translates into abatements by 4.75 GtCO 2/yr in 2050, which cannot
be achieved by implementing cheap alone. The cheapest way to achieve this objective in 2050 is to
use cheap to abate as much GHG emissions as possible, i.e. 1.5 GtCO 2/yr. Because cheap cannot
penetrate faster than 50 MtCO 2/yr2, it has to enter in 2021. Then 3.25 GtCO 2/yr remain to be
abated by deep in 2050. To do so, deep has to enter as soon as 2006, 15 years before cheap.
8One could say that this would be done by ￿starting￿ with the cheapest activity and ￿continuing￿ with the more
expensive one until the emission objective is achieved. But in this context, the terms ￿starting￿ and ￿continuing￿ would
not have a chronological meaning, as the abatement activities would both be implemented instantly in 2050. Instead,
those words would denote the fact that the social planner, while designing the optimal strategy, would ￿rst consider
to implement cheap and then to implement deep.
13This examples highlights the fact than when establishing a merit-order to design an optimal
abatement strategy, time may play a more important role than cost.
The fourfold reduction in emissions leads to cumulative emissions of 175 GtCO 2, and is thus com-
parable to the simulation proposed in Section 4.1. Compared to the cumulative-emission-constrained
simulation (CC), this emission-constrained simulation (EC) leads to start cheap later and deep sooner.
Short-term abatements are lower ￿ for instance, they amount to 750 MtCO 2/yr in 2020 in EC,
against 1.2 GtCO2/yr in CC ￿ but long-term abatements are higher. The loss of when-￿exibility
eventually raises the present cost of abatements, which amounts to 390 G$ in the CC case and
to 630G$ in the EC simulation for the same ￿nal atmospheric concentration. 9 This illustrates the
fact that cumulative emission objectives, with full when-￿exibility, allow the social planner to ￿nd
lower-cost pathways to reach equivalent climate targets than emission objectives.
A more systematic analysis is presented in Fig. 7. It gives the optimal entry dates of both activities
(cheap and deep), as a function of the 2050 emission target. It shows that when the emission target is
lower than 2 GtCO2/yr (i.e. when the abatement objective is higher than 3 GtCO 2/yr), the optimal
strategy starts to implement the expensive activity before the cheap one.
Figure 7: Entry date of each activity as a function of emission objective for 2050. For ambitious emission
targets (below 2 GtCO2/yr), the expensive option with large abatement potential is implemented before the
cheaper option.
The fact that, with emission targets, expensive options may have to be implemented before cheap
ones is problematic. Considering the di￿culty for the government in creating a credible long-term
signal for the price of carbon ￿ and in government ability to commit in general (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003)￿, economic actors cannot rely on long-term prices. If
actors consider only the current carbon price, then a carbon price of 60 $/(tCO 2) would be necessary
to trigger the entry of deep (see Tab.1). Fig. 6 shows that this activity should be implemented as
early as 2005 to reach the stringent objective (emissions of 750 MtCO 2/yr in 2050) at the lowest
9Note that 390 G$ is the lowest possible cost to reach the carbon budget constraint, while 630G$ is the lowest cost
for reaching the same carbon budget through one aggregated emission target in 2050.
14possible cost. But this high carbon price would also trigger the implementation of cheap (because its
marginal cost, 30 $/(tCO2), is lower than the signal) in 2005, i.e. too soon, leading to a suboptimal
abatement pathway. In this case, achieving the optimal pathway through di￿erentiated carbon prices
across sectors makes sense. 10
This ￿nding is even stronger when taking into account a shorter-term target, such as the EU
target to abate by 20 or 30% in 2020. Short-term targets are a priori relevant because there is
visibility over the short term on technology availability, macroeconomics trends and institutional
frameworks. But focusing on aggregated short-term objectives has also its drawbacks, as the next
section will show.
5.2 The in￿uence of long-term objectives on short-term strategies
Here, we compare two simulations with the same short-term aggregated target, but di￿erent long-
term targets. The ￿rst simulation, labeled SO (Short-term Only), has a short-term constraint for
2020, but no long-term constraint:
E(2020) = 4:25 GtCO2/yr (10)
The second simulation, labeled SL (Short-term and Long-term objectives), provides the optimal
abatement strategy to reach the same short-term target for 2020, but with an additional long-term
constraint, namely a fourfold reduction in GHG emissions in 2050. 11 In this simulation, there are
thus two emission milestones (see Eq. 9) with the following emissions objectives:
E(2050) = 1:25 GtCO2/yr (11)
E(2020) = 4:25 GtCO2/yr (12)
Our objective is to assess the di￿erence ￿ over the short-term ￿ between a strategy aiming at
a short-term target and a strategy aiming at both short-term and long-term targets. Our purpose
here is to explore the impact of long-term emission objectives on the short-term strategy.
Figure 8 compares the optimal abatement strategies from 2000 to 2020 in the two cases. With both
the 2020 and the 2050 objective (simulation SL, panel a:), the social planner starts implementing
deep in 2006, and does not implement cheap before 2020 (as in Section 5.1). In contrast, when
the 2050 milestone is disregarded (simulation SO, panel b:), the climate objective seems easier to
10More technically, this reminds us that in a dynamic framework, the equimarginal principle does not necessarily
translate in equal instantaneous carbon prices across economic sectors (Gilotte, 2004; Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2007),
as it does in a static framework (del Rio Gonzalez, 2008). Our model does return equal marginal values of investment
in both activities at each time step; but these marginal values cannot be interpreted directly as a static carbon shadow
price at those time steps, because they arise from an intertemporal optimization and encompass information on inertia.
11In this case, with perfect credibility of the 2050 target, the 2020 milestone does not add anything, since a simulation
with only the 2050 target already leads to emissions of 4.25 GtCO 2/yr in 2020 (this simulation is thus identical to the
simulation presented in Fig. 6, panel b:).
15a: Taking into account both 2020 and 2050 objective b: Taking into account 2020 objective only
Figure 8: Comparison of optimal abatement strategies to reach the same target for 2020, taking into account
or disregarding the longer-term 2050 objective. With an ambitious long-term target, the short-term strategy
is based on the more expensive option with higher potential, not on the cheapest option.
achieve. As a result, the social planner starts abating latter (in 2010 vs 2006) and uses cheaper and
lower-potential options, namely cheap and deep instead of deep only. The discounted expenditures
in abatement measures amounts to 28 G$, against 112 G$ when the 2050 objective is taken into
account: the optimal short-term ￿nancial e￿ort is much higher if the long-term target is taken into
account (even though the abatment in MtCO 2 is the same).
If the 2050 target is not taken into account in the 2000-2020 period, then the 2050 target may
appear in 2020 extremely costly, or even impossible, to achieve. In this illustrative example, the
fourfold reduction in emissions becomes indeed impossible to achieve in 2050 if the long-term objective
is not taken into account from the beginning, in 2000.
In other words, despite aggregate emissions being abated at the same pace in SO as in SL, the
SO pathway produces a lock-in in a carbon intensive pathway that cannot be reversed in the second
period from 2020 to 2050. In plain language, the optimal strategy to reach the 2020 target is di￿erent
(and more expensive) if the 2050 objective is included in the optimization. With an ambitious long-
term objective, the short-term target needs to be achieved through the implementation of the options
with the largest potentials and the largest inertia, not with the cheapest solutions, as the MAC curve
could suggest (see Fig 3).
6 Conclusion
This article investigates the use of expert-based MACCs to design abatement strategies. It shows
that introducing inertia, in the form of a maximum amount of abatement that can be achieved over
a given period of time, changes signi￿cantly the message from MACCs. This ￿cost in time￿, which
complements the ￿nancial cost, has a large in￿uence on the rank order of various strategies. In
16particular, the dynamic aspect makes MACCs radically di￿erent from merit-order curves: at one
point in time, the best approach is not to set an instantaneous carbon price and introduce all the
abatement options with a marginal cost below it.
With an objective in terms of cumulative emissions over a long period of time ￿ a good proxy for
climate change ￿, it is preferable to start by implementing the cheapest strategies, but it makes sense
to implement the more expensive ones at the same time, or at least before all the potential of the
cheapest options has been exhausted. Reaching ambitious objectives requires the implementation of
abatement options that are slow to act, such as urban planning. This means that the implementation
date is also de￿ned by the time constraint, not only by the cost of options.
We also tested objectives expressed in terms of aggregated abatements at one point in time, closer
to the actual practices, e.g., the -75% in 2050 of the United Kingdom. In that case, the order can
even be reversed, it can be preferable to start with the implementation of the most expensive options,
if their potential is higher and their inertia is large. This optimal schedule cannot be enforced with
a carbon price in a world without perfect foresight and perfect credibility of the long-term carbon
price signal.
Moreover, we show that short-term emission target can dangerously mask longer-term targets. In
the European Union, the best way of reducing emissions by 20% by 2020 is di￿erent, depending on
whether this is the ultimate objective or only one milestone in a trajectory toward a 75% reduction
in 2050. With an ambitious long-term objective, the short term target needs to be achieved through
the implementation of the options with the largest potentials and the largest inertia, not with the
cheapest solutions.
These results con￿rm the need to account for inertia in various economic sectors in the design of
climate policies. Transforming climate objectives into emissions pathways cannot be done with ag-
gregated models if perfect foresight and long-term policy credibility are not assumed. Without these
assumptions, emissions pathway need to be multi-sectoral, distinguishing in particular heterogeneous
capital turnovers (Lecocq et al, 1998; Jaccard and Rivers, 2007), and promising activities subject
to learning by doing (del Rio Gonzalez, 2008). Policymakers could for instance use the information
provided by MAC curves and additional information on inertia and learning-by-doing potential to
identify a decarbonization path in each sector (or activity). In that case, emissions target can be
made credible and enforceable, and mimic the abatement pathways obtained in models with more
appropriate targets that allow for when-￿exibility.
There is a balance to maintain, however: emission objectives (or sectoral policies) should be
targeted enough to distinguish di￿erences in inertia, but broad enough to let economic agents select
the best options and technologies to reach them. Because of information asymmetry and the risk
from rent-seeking behavior, micro-managing mitigation by de￿ning too targeted objectives can be
counter-productive (La￿ont, 1999). Also, objectives need to be updated when new information is
available; for instance if one activity turns out to be less promising than expected. In a nutshell,
17the de￿nition of mitigation policies should take into account recent propositions on industrial policy
(Rodrik, 2008).
In the European Union, the current mitigation objective has been set for 2020 only. It could
therefore lead to economic actors to focus on cheap and rapid solutions, and to neglect high-potential
but high-inertia options which will however be required to meet an ambitious objective in 2050. One
solution could be to count on the 2020 target (and the corresponding carbon price created by the
EU ETS system) to take care of the fast-to-implement solutions, and to add policies targeting other
solutions with high inertia and potential. Examples are the existing objective of 20% of renewable
energies in 2020, the fuel economy standards in the auto industry, and proposed changes in land-use
planning, building norms and infrastructure design. None of those policies would necessarily imply
equal carbon prices across sectors at one point in time.
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